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[Music]

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well I was working up in Chattanooga I'd

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been there for years after getting out

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of Georgia Tech and I heard about the

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space not the space but the missile

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programs going on down here and I was

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curious came down for an interview just

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about the time that Explorer 1 was

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launched got hired a couple of months

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later went into the program coordination

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office and was there about a year and

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then transferred to the ARPA at the time

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was called ARPA NASA systems project

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office Saturn was building up from

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starting with the booster in 58

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from there on it went to the Silver

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Stein committee report recommending

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using liquid hydrogen for upper stages

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and we knew at that point we were headed

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there was something new all the time it

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was exciting

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the hardware was involved ABMA ABMA

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beforehand and then nasa after it was

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I got involved with the Saturn program

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when I joined the Saturn Systems office

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and and and stayed with it until I left

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in 1965 to go to MIT on a Sloan

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fellowship but during that time we

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worked on procurement packages I helped

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write the model specifications for the

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s4 stage than the s2 stage that led to a

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bidders conference and I was surprised

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at the end of the bidders conference my

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boss target announced that I would be

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well it was the first high

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in stage that NASA have entered into we

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had a procurement process after writing

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the model spec Douglas in Santa Monica

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won the contract though we had

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immediately after that the announcement

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that Douglas got the award we had a

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group of over 50 people from Marshall

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actually at the time it was a VM a it

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was in 59 what we went out to see the

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contractor facilities and and meeting

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the people that it was a real exciting

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trip out there and we saw a firsthand

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the what was going on in in the airforce

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contractor side of the house here

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locally we were involved with Chrysler

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and and Jupiter missile redstone missile

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so it was it was a it was a new event

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hydrogen liquid hydrogen and then it

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gets gaseous in a hurry because it's a

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it's at minus 423 degrees F it's very

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volatile it'll it'll the gas will go

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through anything the finest crack it and

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it was considered dangerous

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but convair out on the west coast had

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been working with a center stage with

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using the rl10 engine and they were

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having some successes but they had a lot

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of leaks well somehow or other and in

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our development of the s4 stage by

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Douglas we didn't have a lot of leaks it

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was pretty well contained but it was

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still volatile and you could start a

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s4 was the the first hydrogen stage that

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we had and the Saturn 5 came along

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during between 1960 and 1962 the the c5

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configuration was developed during that

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period it was decided that we're gonna

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have a third stage like the s4 but it

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had to have one j2 engine have a higher

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loading and have a lot of different

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different functions it was a natural

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choice for NASA to just say sole-source

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the s4 be because the experience that

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Douglas had in with the s4 I got

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involved with the s4 in the s2 with the

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source evaluation board which itself was

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an exciting thing it was man by Wernher

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von Braun Everhart Reis Willi motsek

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headquarters procurement people top

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level so there I was them I've I've kid

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about 33 at the time I think and I was

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hearing these guys talk about the

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contractors the capabilities and and and

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how we were going to distinguish which

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one was the better contractor to select

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and then recommendation was made to the

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NASA Administrator and choices were made

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well one of the criteria was that we

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make the interfaces between the stages

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simple and the only interfaces your

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structural tie downs and electronic

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commands from a guidance system to the

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engines for gambling for separation so

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the the the interfaces were relatively

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simple and that was I think made made

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integrating stages from different

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the s2 started out with the procurement

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packet package and I think it was 1960

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and no 61 and the selection was made but

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this was a year or two years that I

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guess two years before the the final c5

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Saturn five configuration was

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established so North American was

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selected I got to be acting program

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manager our project manager had to go

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ahead for a c3 configuration at that

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time knowing that we were going to

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evolve into the something bigger but the

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government wanted to get the contractor

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on board so he could have an advantage

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of the preliminary design in fact he

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helped NASA with ideas on on the Saturn

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5 configuration the Apollo program oddly

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enough was selected and given to North

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American Aviation as an ID at Downey

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about two months after the s2 was

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selected and we were all really aghast

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at that how can the government put two

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huge contractors contracts into into one

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contractor shop but it happened during

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the ensuing period that period leading

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up to the fall of 62 both contractors

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did a lot of preliminary design leading

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up to the Saturn 5 configuration it's

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this contractor that's an ID and Downey

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was harboring two major contractors

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within within a half a mile radius it

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was it was her and I was out there for a

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year after well well it was in 62 fall

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of 62 I went out for a year and I got a

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feel for the they not the confusion but

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the constraints that were involved in

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and in getting worked

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done by the contractor and it was pretty

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obvious that a lot of things were were

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slipping

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well the contracts proceeded from that

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point 62 and they were given to go ahead

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until 64 and progress was being made but

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it was slow and the schedule was

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obviously slipping costs were going up

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and these were cost plus fixed fee

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contracts so the contractor did what he

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had to do to get to meet the model spec

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requirements it was a it was a strange

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period and and during that period s to

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seal Beach facility had been constructed

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and and they had started building the s2

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bulkhead as well as the the other

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components that make up the tank when I

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left the program in 65 we had just

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completed or a quasi CDR it wasn't the

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kind of CDR as we've had since then but

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we accepted it because we wanted to get

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on with a program and other than the

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problems with having so many so much

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work done in one shop and the delays

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work work was it was really accomplished

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and by the way when I first got out

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there in 62 the contractor was cleanly

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aware of the problem and he suggested

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that the s2 be transferred for

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development in Tulsa they had a facility

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in Tulsa so immediately my boss Oswald

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longa took umbrage with that that to

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have the s2 selected on the basis of

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development in Los Angeles with the Seal

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Beach facility being built just strictly

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for the s2 it was unconscionable to move

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the s2 down there well a compromise was

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made we decided that I'll call it

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dumpster

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there's structures that don't have a lot

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of complicated electronics could be

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shipped or sent down there for design

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and manufacture these are the inter

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stages the thrust structure but as far

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as the cryogenic tanks they had to be

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kept and there the design and

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development had to be kept in in County

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in Los Angeles Seal Beach well we could

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observe the fact that they were making

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progress in design it was slow and the

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crunch didn't come until the

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manufacturing of the common bulkhead

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started and that was a difficult job in

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19 1964 general Sam Phillips who was

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headquarters head of the Apollo program

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was aware of the schedule slips that

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were impending they increased cost and

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he initiated a bunch of tiger teams we

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came out to Downey and we spent the

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better part of a month reviewing

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intimate details and and and

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organizations as well as design and

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development of the s2 and it was also

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being the Apollo spacecraft was also a

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part of that review small disciplinary

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teams would literally invade the

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contractor and evaluate the progress

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that effort in 65 ended up with a

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major-general Sam Phillips and George

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Muller to write a letter to the head of

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North American the result was the

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contractor assigned a new guy to head up

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the s2 program Heatley assigned a new

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guy to head up the Apollo program and

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and in progress well we had progress

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from then on but it was still extremely

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difficult really for the rest all most

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he was like a fighter pilot like John

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McCain he he news business

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he early on during World War two he and

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Bob Gilruth who headed up the Apollo

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program at Langley had solved a problem

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on the p-51 it was an air scoop problem

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and that that relationship I guess might

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have helped the getting the Apollo

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program assigned to him he was a unique

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guy and we had several meetings with him

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and he was solicitous help answered our

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questions and and sharp technically and

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well we were in that period in 68 64 and

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65 when Sam Phillips is known as his

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work with the review teams and and NASA

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had and announced the possibility an

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opportunity for to get a nomination of

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people who would go to MIT on Sloan

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program and I volunteered well I had to

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make the application I went through

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interviews with the head of the program

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at MIT and eventually I got selected

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well that was a an inflection point of

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the program the following Sam Phillips

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initial operation out there and I I was

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given an opportunity to either stay on

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the s2 or or go to MIT well I wasn't

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gonna miss that opportunity while I was

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gone I read in the newspaper events that

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occurred of the s2 program one of which

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was the destruction of the structural

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test vehicle at Seal Beach for me being

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up in Massachusetts it was a shock but I

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could do nothing about it other than

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just absorb the fact that it happened

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but I learned more about it when I got

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back there a year later the accident

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occurred the the the the tank broke had

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water in there to simulate the

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propellant loads and of course there

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were actuators to apply loads to it and

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the tank broke at one hundred and forty

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four percent of the load the design

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requirement was one point for which the

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difference between that was negligible

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and the test was evaluated as being

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acceptable even in spite of the failure

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and it demonstrated that the s2 tank was

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extremely efficient but it was getting

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it was tremendous pressure and

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excitement to do to get things done you

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could hardly talk too long to people

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about like I wanted to know what

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happened and everybody was too busy

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trying to get the ahead of the schedule

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and and get to get the project on track

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it was a rather more than exciting

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one of the other problems that s2 faced

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was the lunar lander program grumman was

275
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overweight and there was nothing that

276
00:17:19,429 --> 00:17:14,520
could be done about it

277
00:17:21,439 --> 00:17:19,439
so s2 is selected to take weight out of

278
00:17:25,069 --> 00:17:21,449
the structure in order to increase or

279
00:17:30,500 --> 00:17:25,079
allow the added weight in the lunar

280
00:17:32,630 --> 00:17:30,510
module well in doing so they would go

281
00:17:36,140 --> 00:17:32,640
from one vehicle to another one

282
00:17:39,440 --> 00:17:36,150
redesigned just to squeeze out weight in

283
00:17:42,440 --> 00:17:39,450
fact an example in an extreme example

284
00:17:44,480 --> 00:17:42,450
was one of the sections of the common

285
00:17:49,510 --> 00:17:44,490
buck the upper facing that faced the

286
00:17:53,960 --> 00:17:49,520
hydrogen tank the hydrogen material that

287
00:17:57,649 --> 00:17:53,970
thickness was about 25 thousandths on on

288
00:17:59,539 --> 00:17:57,659
one section plus a minus five well that

289
00:18:01,279 --> 00:17:59,549
material started out about a hundred and

290
00:18:04,210 --> 00:18:01,289
twenty-five thousandths the upper the

291
00:18:07,070 --> 00:18:04,220
upper bulkhead on the common bulkhead

292
00:18:09,020 --> 00:18:07,080
and they had to have lands about the

293
00:18:12,200 --> 00:18:09,030
thickness of that material about a

294
00:18:15,740 --> 00:18:12,210
hundred twenty-five thousand so they

295
00:18:19,220 --> 00:18:15,750
went to chemical mill operation where

296
00:18:22,760 --> 00:18:19,230
you take a caustic solution and the

297
00:18:24,980 --> 00:18:22,770
leach out the material very carefully to

298
00:18:27,430 --> 00:18:24,990
get it down to the the dimension that

299
00:18:31,010 --> 00:18:27,440
you want like the twenty five thousands

300
00:18:34,010 --> 00:18:31,020
that is an extreme of how they saved

301
00:18:36,710 --> 00:18:34,020
weight on the s2 it was a critical

302
00:18:39,350 --> 00:18:36,720
operation and it was done very carefully

303
00:18:44,090 --> 00:18:39,360
from stage to stage and as the program

304
00:18:48,289 --> 00:18:44,100
developed s2 was able to he got a little

305
00:18:50,270 --> 00:18:48,299
more weight each time and fortunately we

306
00:18:52,340 --> 00:18:50,280
had no problems with the common bulkhead

307
00:18:58,700 --> 00:18:52,350
other than learning how to make it and

308
00:19:06,019 --> 00:19:02,149
the combat bulkhead initially started on

309
00:19:08,960 --> 00:19:06,029
the s4 stage and it was a spheric

310
00:19:13,340 --> 00:19:08,970
spherical a hemispherical rather it was

311
00:19:16,340 --> 00:19:13,350
just to clamshells good with a phenolic

312
00:19:18,890 --> 00:19:16,350
: comb interface in between them the

313
00:19:21,940 --> 00:19:18,900
sandwich so to speak bonded together a

314
00:19:25,399 --> 00:19:21,950
rigid struck a very rigid structure so

315
00:19:28,600 --> 00:19:25,409
the common bulkhead was initially

316
00:19:32,380 --> 00:19:28,610
started by Douglas in the case of the s2

317
00:19:38,899 --> 00:19:32,390
north american proposed a half ellipsoid

318
00:19:42,649 --> 00:19:38,909
shape so that the the height of the dork

319
00:19:45,590 --> 00:19:42,659
head was shorter and of course the s2 is

320
00:19:49,539 --> 00:19:45,600
33 feet in diameter and that bulkhead

321
00:19:53,389 --> 00:19:49,549
had to be carefully this kind for

322
00:19:55,909 --> 00:19:53,399
tolerances to made up with the hydrogen

323
00:19:58,610 --> 00:19:55,919
tank above it and the and the oxygen

324
00:20:01,279 --> 00:19:58,620
tank below it there was the interface

325
00:20:04,100 --> 00:20:01,289
between that those two proponents of

326
00:20:08,990 --> 00:20:04,110
course thermally there's no problem

327
00:20:13,210 --> 00:20:09,000
one was minus 423 and the other - 296

328
00:20:17,419 --> 00:20:13,220
about 26 degrees difference but it was

329
00:20:24,150 --> 00:20:17,429
critical if it broke the whole whole

330
00:20:33,090 --> 00:20:28,230
in terms of time it was all crunch time

331
00:20:36,870 --> 00:20:33,100
in 1965 we felt we had completed the

332
00:20:41,159 --> 00:20:36,880
design the contractor had built a common

333
00:20:44,789 --> 00:20:41,169
bulkhead he had built the stage at Seal

334
00:20:47,430 --> 00:20:44,799
Beach the first one well the first one

335
00:20:51,240 --> 00:20:47,440
off the line was asked to structural

336
00:20:55,590 --> 00:20:51,250
vehicle as to s and that failed the next

337
00:20:58,470 --> 00:20:55,600
one off the line was the dynamic stage

338
00:21:02,909 --> 00:20:58,480
and then the all systems vehicle the all

339
00:21:06,060 --> 00:21:02,919
systems vehicle was a a flight type the

340
00:21:08,279 --> 00:21:06,070
first item off the line that was to be

341
00:21:10,740 --> 00:21:08,289
flight design because of all the

342
00:21:13,220 --> 00:21:10,750
problems that were reviewed in the

343
00:21:17,149 --> 00:21:13,230
Apollo program and particularly the s2

344
00:21:22,380 --> 00:21:17,159
it was decided a rather major decision

345
00:21:27,840 --> 00:21:22,390
to have the MTF in fact the it was

346
00:21:31,919 --> 00:21:27,850
started back in 63 naa was directed in I

347
00:21:35,299 --> 00:21:31,929
guess it was January of 65 that the all

348
00:21:38,399 --> 00:21:35,309
systems vehicle would not be tested in

349
00:21:43,169 --> 00:21:38,409
San Santa Susana it would be shipped

350
00:21:44,760 --> 00:21:43,179
down to MTF all the subsequent flight

351
00:21:47,310 --> 00:21:44,770
articles would also go down there for

352
00:21:50,060 --> 00:21:47,320
being tested this was a major change

353
00:21:53,669 --> 00:21:50,070
from what was originally planned and and

354
00:21:56,250 --> 00:21:53,679
it was a it was quite an inflection in

355
00:22:02,279 --> 00:21:56,260
the program but it was it was intended

356
00:22:06,029 --> 00:22:02,289
to save it cost have the testing done at

357
00:22:07,980 --> 00:22:06,039
a NASA facility that was that was the

358
00:22:11,669 --> 00:22:07,990
first inflection in the program that

359
00:22:16,200 --> 00:22:11,679
direction and then at the same time we

360
00:22:20,210 --> 00:22:16,210
had Sam Phillips reviews and all this

361
00:22:22,380 --> 00:22:20,220
time hardware was being built the SS 2

362
00:22:25,640 --> 00:22:22,390
asked the structural vehicle was

363
00:22:30,390 --> 00:22:25,650
completed and tested and and destroyed

364
00:22:33,270 --> 00:22:30,400
the all systems test vehicle the first

365
00:22:36,810 --> 00:22:33,280
flight type off the line to be tested

366
00:22:37,529 --> 00:22:36,820
was in process and being built in fact

367
00:22:40,859 --> 00:22:37,539
it

368
00:22:50,849 --> 00:22:40,869
was delivered in the summer of 65 down

369
00:22:56,060 --> 00:22:50,859
to MTF but by May in 1966 it blew up at

370
00:23:00,029 --> 00:22:56,070
MTF but it was it was not a an accident

371
00:23:03,659 --> 00:23:00,039
involving cryogens it was it happened at

372
00:23:08,249 --> 00:23:03,669
night somebody on the on the first shift

373
00:23:11,159 --> 00:23:08,259
had left some vowels and switches in the

374
00:23:15,539 --> 00:23:11,169
wrong position or in a position that and

375
00:23:18,269 --> 00:23:15,549
and the night crew had not been notified

376
00:23:21,739 --> 00:23:18,279
or didn't get the word and they over

377
00:23:26,849 --> 00:23:21,749
pressurized the hydrogen tank with

378
00:23:28,950 --> 00:23:26,859
gaseous helium and it blew but the

379
00:23:31,769 --> 00:23:28,960
saving grace there was the time that it

380
00:23:34,499 --> 00:23:31,779
had spent down at MTF they had run a

381
00:23:38,009 --> 00:23:34,509
number of short duration runs with with

382
00:23:42,570 --> 00:23:38,019
the oil systems vehicle and about a week

383
00:23:45,839 --> 00:23:42,580
before it blew up at night they had run

384
00:23:49,849 --> 00:23:45,849
a full duration test on the s2 there was

385
00:23:54,509 --> 00:23:49,859
some confidence there that it would work

386
00:23:57,330 --> 00:23:54,519
but again you lose a stage you lose a

387
00:24:00,629 --> 00:23:57,340
lot of testing that you you want to get

388
00:24:02,669 --> 00:24:00,639
information from so the next item to be

389
00:24:06,269 --> 00:24:02,679
tested as MTF was the first flight

390
00:24:09,419 --> 00:24:06,279
article s tube one and fortunately it

391
00:24:12,930 --> 00:24:09,429
went through the preliminary tests and

392
00:24:18,899 --> 00:24:12,940
the final full duration and will ship

393
00:24:27,570 --> 00:24:23,100
the s4 and the s4b stages and internal

394
00:24:31,889 --> 00:24:27,580
insulation its construction had they

395
00:24:35,129 --> 00:24:31,899
made waffle hog outs cutouts on the

396
00:24:40,769 --> 00:24:35,139
inside of the the tanks that was it was

397
00:24:42,810 --> 00:24:40,779
an exact follow up of what Douglas had

398
00:24:45,810 --> 00:24:42,820
done with the Thor vehicle how they

399
00:24:50,669 --> 00:24:45,820
built the this structure so they had

400
00:24:53,249 --> 00:24:50,679
these pockets in the inside about an

401
00:24:55,110 --> 00:24:53,259
inch deep and they put insulation in

402
00:24:57,720 --> 00:24:55,120
there and then they covered all these

403
00:25:01,080 --> 00:24:57,730
pockets with a with a with a membrane

404
00:25:03,389 --> 00:25:01,090
and and unmonitored and the idea was

405
00:25:07,560 --> 00:25:03,399
that liquid hydrogen on the inside of

406
00:25:09,960 --> 00:25:07,570
the tank would clearly penetrate that

407
00:25:12,509 --> 00:25:09,970
because hydrogen will go through almost

408
00:25:14,549 --> 00:25:12,519
anything it's most correct and the

409
00:25:17,840 --> 00:25:14,559
theory was that in that space where they

410
00:25:21,629 --> 00:25:17,850
had this insulation you'd have two-phase

411
00:25:24,149 --> 00:25:21,639
hydrogen close to the outer skin it

412
00:25:26,820 --> 00:25:24,159
would definitely be gas close to the

413
00:25:30,779 --> 00:25:26,830
inside of the membrane that separated

414
00:25:32,850 --> 00:25:30,789
the or the the space in between the

415
00:25:36,480 --> 00:25:32,860
where they had the foam it would be a

416
00:25:39,210 --> 00:25:36,490
two-phase with liquid on the inside and

417
00:25:42,830 --> 00:25:39,220
gas on the outside it was it was a

418
00:25:46,619 --> 00:25:42,840
rather rudimentary my method of

419
00:25:50,070 --> 00:25:46,629
insulating hydrogen but that was the

420
00:25:52,470 --> 00:25:50,080
Douglass proposal well s2 came along and

421
00:25:56,700 --> 00:25:52,480
they decided going to have external

422
00:26:02,639 --> 00:25:56,710
insulation and their plan was to make

423
00:26:04,529 --> 00:26:02,649
panels of similar material of a foam and

424
00:26:06,320 --> 00:26:04,539
it would be bonded to the outside of the

425
00:26:10,919 --> 00:26:06,330
tank and then covered with a membrane

426
00:26:11,279 --> 00:26:10,929
and the idea there again was inside the

427
00:26:15,299 --> 00:26:11,289
tank

428
00:26:19,820 --> 00:26:15,309
you had liquid hydrogen at minus 423 the

429
00:26:26,029 --> 00:26:19,830
design for the s2 was to purge that

430
00:26:30,629 --> 00:26:26,039
those panels with which had well

431
00:26:32,560 --> 00:26:30,639
honeycomb that was perforated so that

432
00:26:35,080 --> 00:26:32,570
the hydrogen gas

433
00:26:37,450 --> 00:26:35,090
flow up through it and the idea there

434
00:26:40,570 --> 00:26:37,460
was like similar to what Douglas had on

435
00:26:44,919 --> 00:26:40,580
the inside by the outside of the skin

436
00:26:49,210 --> 00:26:44,929
tank it was minus 23 for 23 outside

437
00:26:50,799 --> 00:26:49,220
these one-and-a-half inch panels you you

438
00:26:53,049 --> 00:26:50,809
didn't have atmosphere air on the

439
00:26:57,430 --> 00:26:53,059
outside and of course it would be cold

440
00:26:59,680 --> 00:26:57,440
but you wouldn't have minus 423 on the

441
00:27:03,519 --> 00:26:59,690
outside but it would be cold enough that

442
00:27:05,950 --> 00:27:03,529
the atmosphere would Frost up on the

443
00:27:08,799 --> 00:27:05,960
outside of the tank well it was a more

444
00:27:11,320 --> 00:27:08,809
efficient thermal design and the reason

445
00:27:14,619 --> 00:27:11,330
they did it was because the aluminum

446
00:27:16,240 --> 00:27:14,629
alloy that was used in the tanks both in

447
00:27:22,899 --> 00:27:16,250
the s4b

448
00:27:28,060 --> 00:27:22,909
and in the s2 was 2014 t6 alloy and at

449
00:27:30,399 --> 00:27:28,070
minus 423 it was a lot stronger it was

450
00:27:33,419 --> 00:27:30,409
it reached its maximum strength and and

451
00:27:39,720 --> 00:27:33,429
the higher strength you can calculate

452
00:27:45,749 --> 00:27:39,730
the less material you needed for for the

453
00:27:48,999 --> 00:27:45,759
design of the skin and it was a very

454
00:27:52,149 --> 00:27:49,009
very efficient structurally as long as

455
00:27:57,340 --> 00:27:52,159
the material was four minus four it was

456
00:28:01,899 --> 00:27:57,350
was hydrogen temperatures but on the s4

457
00:28:03,580 --> 00:28:01,909
be that skin was not that cold so it was

458
00:28:05,769 --> 00:28:03,590
a less less efficient structure

459
00:28:10,289 --> 00:28:05,779
insulation for the SUV evolved from

460
00:28:12,999 --> 00:28:10,299
these panels to foam they found out that

461
00:28:16,690 --> 00:28:13,009
when these panels fell off a cook way of

462
00:28:18,999 --> 00:28:16,700
fixing was to use spray-on foam and they

463
00:28:22,330 --> 00:28:19,009
were coming off every time you you fill

464
00:28:26,409 --> 00:28:22,340
the tank and empty the tank doing prior

465
00:28:29,499 --> 00:28:26,419
launch pre launch operations and it was

466
00:28:32,289 --> 00:28:29,509
later used on the e tank and then the

467
00:28:39,850 --> 00:28:32,299
and the later stages that were launched

468
00:28:46,149 --> 00:28:43,180
well my wife and I went down to the cave

469
00:28:48,370 --> 00:28:46,159
for seven months to get the Skylab ready

470
00:28:51,370 --> 00:28:48,380
for launch and during that period the

471
00:28:54,789 --> 00:28:51,380
next to the last flight I think it was

472
00:28:56,350 --> 00:28:54,799
the 17th flight it was it was a night

473
00:28:59,200 --> 00:28:56,360
flight it was in fact it was the only

474
00:29:03,370 --> 00:28:59,210
night flight and while we were building

475
00:29:07,870 --> 00:29:03,380
up the Skylab in the VAB it was being

476
00:29:10,169 --> 00:29:07,880
prepared and we we got our passes to go

477
00:29:17,740 --> 00:29:10,179
out to see it and we got out on the

478
00:29:22,110 --> 00:29:17,750
highway adjacent to the the a B my wife

479
00:29:24,970 --> 00:29:22,120
my daughter her husband and we just

480
00:29:27,580 --> 00:29:24,980
enjoyed seeing it all that fire that

481
00:29:29,710 --> 00:29:27,590
would I might I might launch is

482
00:29:33,759 --> 00:29:29,720
something else you have all this fire

483
00:29:37,590 --> 00:29:33,769
the whole sky lights up so it was it was

484
00:29:40,269 --> 00:29:37,600
an exciting time but then after I guess

485
00:29:42,460 --> 00:29:40,279
five six months later we launched the

486
00:29:49,400 --> 00:29:42,470
Skylab and had some problems with it

487
00:29:54,950 --> 00:29:52,250
or a number of concepts that were

488
00:29:57,020 --> 00:29:54,960
brought up the first one

489
00:30:00,710 --> 00:29:57,030
the initial idea and it really started

490
00:30:01,850 --> 00:30:00,720
before I got there was get man in space

491
00:30:05,810 --> 00:30:01,860
how do we do it

492
00:30:09,830 --> 00:30:05,820
the s4b is going to be in space because

493
00:30:11,960 --> 00:30:09,840
it's your third stage let's make a hatch

494
00:30:13,840 --> 00:30:11,970
that can be opened they actually

495
00:30:16,910 --> 00:30:13,850
designed a hatch at the top of the

496
00:30:19,970 --> 00:30:16,920
hydrogen tank with the idea that maybe a

497
00:30:22,340 --> 00:30:19,980
man in a spacesuit could get into the

498
00:30:24,530 --> 00:30:22,350
high into the tank and and do something

499
00:30:27,410 --> 00:30:24,540
I mean there was a rather primitive idea

500
00:30:31,720 --> 00:30:27,420
but that was one of the first ideas and

501
00:30:34,400 --> 00:30:31,730
quickly discarded but the hatch idea

502
00:30:37,850 --> 00:30:34,410
continued because that was necessary

503
00:30:40,480 --> 00:30:37,860
when we had the full full of Skylab you

504
00:30:43,360 --> 00:30:40,490
had a access to the s4b

505
00:30:46,940 --> 00:30:43,370
hydrogen tank which became actually our

506
00:30:49,670 --> 00:30:46,950
space station to go from the airlock

507
00:30:51,890 --> 00:30:49,680
module into the orbital workshop it was

508
00:30:54,590 --> 00:30:51,900
called then there were other ideas that

509
00:30:58,760 --> 00:30:54,600
one of the prime ideas was the Sun

510
00:31:02,030 --> 00:30:58,770
telescope that became and it was a now

511
00:31:04,760 --> 00:31:02,040
in-house project Marshall did so there

512
00:31:08,420 --> 00:31:04,770
was a lot of effort inside the senator

513
00:31:11,240 --> 00:31:08,430
toward developing that telescope the

514
00:31:14,660 --> 00:31:11,250
interior or the workshop from the time I

515
00:31:17,660 --> 00:31:14,670
got involved until then a lot of ideas

516
00:31:20,690 --> 00:31:17,670
were developed designs produced for the

517
00:31:24,880 --> 00:31:20,700
interior of the orbital workshop we

518
00:31:28,850 --> 00:31:24,890
looked at what the submarine what

519
00:31:30,770 --> 00:31:28,860
submarine life was for people in in a

520
00:31:34,250 --> 00:31:30,780
confined area for a long period of time

521
00:31:37,520 --> 00:31:34,260
we even visited one of the atomic subs

522
00:31:40,220 --> 00:31:37,530
of in San Diego just to see what the

523
00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:40,230
situation was to live in a in a confined

524
00:31:48,320 --> 00:31:43,370
area for in that case was 90 days but

525
00:31:52,220 --> 00:31:48,330
our plans on the Skylab the first

526
00:31:55,130 --> 00:31:52,230
mission was to be 28 days the second 60

527
00:31:58,580 --> 00:31:55,140
days in the third 84 days three

528
00:32:05,520 --> 00:31:58,590
different separate missions so it wasn't

529
00:32:05,530 --> 00:32:08,430
well

530
00:32:13,250 --> 00:32:10,529
a lot of people were contributing ideas

531
00:32:18,149 --> 00:32:13,260
and they said well Raymond Loewy

532
00:32:21,419 --> 00:32:18,159
invented the coke bottle shape and he's

533
00:32:25,710 --> 00:32:21,429
reputed to have invented the the shape

534
00:32:28,860 --> 00:32:25,720
of the early Studebaker that was the

535
00:32:31,409 --> 00:32:28,870
news and and he had a reputation for

536
00:32:36,779 --> 00:32:31,419
designing you he was a rather flamboyant

537
00:32:38,730 --> 00:32:36,789
individual and so that NASA hired him to

538
00:32:42,690 --> 00:32:38,740
come down and look at what we were doing

539
00:32:44,279 --> 00:32:42,700
on Skylab and he spent three or four

540
00:32:47,610 --> 00:32:44,289
days there

541
00:32:48,389 --> 00:32:47,620
I even had a picture taken with his

542
00:32:51,149 --> 00:32:48,399
ideas

543
00:32:55,019 --> 00:32:51,159
we're good and we implemented most of

544
00:32:59,000 --> 00:32:55,029
them such as the interior surfaces of

545
00:33:04,100 --> 00:32:59,010
the workshop were were coated with the

546
00:33:07,320 --> 00:33:04,110
plastic material over insulation and not

547
00:33:10,649 --> 00:33:07,330
that was applied on the inside he wanted

548
00:33:13,620 --> 00:33:10,659
it colored pale yellow to make it a

549
00:33:19,200 --> 00:33:13,630
little more easy on the eyes he gave us

550
00:33:21,570 --> 00:33:19,210
a lot of ideas for wardroom the table in

551
00:33:23,730 --> 00:33:21,580
the middle of the wardroom had

552
00:33:26,279 --> 00:33:23,740
restraints where astronauts could

553
00:33:28,830 --> 00:33:26,289
straddle their restraints ether food

554
00:33:31,889 --> 00:33:28,840
read books whatever water room was a

555
00:33:34,200 --> 00:33:31,899
place to relax and and eat and we even

556
00:33:37,230 --> 00:33:34,210
had a window in there he didn't make a

557
00:33:43,249 --> 00:33:37,240
lot of major changes but he he put on

558
00:33:47,419 --> 00:33:44,630
well

559
00:33:53,019 --> 00:33:47,429
the legacy of the Apollo program to my

560
00:34:00,100 --> 00:33:53,029
mind was that it was a just another

561
00:34:05,330 --> 00:34:00,110
event in human history where individuals

562
00:34:10,790 --> 00:34:05,340
human beings decided to go beyond the

563
00:34:15,589 --> 00:34:10,800
next he'll go over the ocean go to the

564
00:34:19,089 --> 00:34:15,599
moon it was it was an event I think that

565
00:34:25,310 --> 00:34:19,099
it was typical of human the human beings